

***Iraq and Chemical & Biological Warfare:  
A Chronology of Events  
Volume II — 1991 to 1995***

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Sample file  
**1994**  
(Second Quarter)

**IMPORTANT NOTICE**

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As with any compilation of this size, there is always a difficulty in deciding at what point to stop collating material and organize and refine the document for publication.

This working draft is, of necessity therefore, a snapshot of the progress towards the final publication. The intention for producing working drafts is to enable reviews of the work in progress. As the final publication format has yet to be decided, sample files are being posted in the form of quarterly sub-sets of the draft chronologies. Those interested in reviewing or contributing to fuller drafts are encouraged to contact Richard Guthrie at <[richard@cbw-events.org.uk](mailto:richard@cbw-events.org.uk)>.

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## **Introduction**

### **Sources and methodology**

The information gathered for this chronology comes from open-source documentation (such as news reports, academic papers, published governmental and inter-governmental reports, and national archives). As in any exercise such as this, the compilation of material has been a collective effort.

### **Chronology entries**

All chronology entries are written in the present tense. Entries for the same date are put in the sequence of events that happened (if specific times are known) or are placed in the order that dawn rises around the world. This means that entries for Japan, for example, will appear before Iran, which will appear before Iraq, which will appear before Germany. Specific times for events are given in GMT/UTC, where known, and local time if that has been specified.

Holding entries are preceded by the letter 'H' to indicate this status. Entries with outstanding queries relating to them are preceded by the letter 'Q'.

**8–26 April 1994** In Iraq, the fourth UN biological inspection team, UNSCOM 72, led by Volker Beck of Germany and numbering 21 people, conducts the first biological inspections in the baseline process of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan [see 14–19 March]. The team visits 30 sites. The main purpose is to verify the declarations submitted by Iraq in January in accordance with the OMV plan. Other objectives are to provide an assessment of the work being undertaken and of the equipment present at the declared biological facilities, many of which have never been visited by UNSCOM; to establish an inventory of that equipment for future tagging; and to draft a format for Iraq's regular reports under the OMV plan.[1]

According to an account published by a former UNSCOM official nearly five years later, the internal report of this inspection to UNSCOM: 'infuriated some of the inspectors on the team and UNSCOM's own biological weapons analysts'. While this report recommended the sites should be monitored further, it concluded that the al Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute, the al Kindi Veterinary Vaccine Production Plant and the Serum and Vaccine Institute at Amariyah were not capable of producing biological weapons and that the al Hakam site could not be used for biological weapons production because it did not have the proper containment facilities. This report also concluded that UNSCOM now knew all there was to know about Iraq's biological activities and that future new data would involve only technical omissions and oversights. 'Partly as a result of this, but partly because Dr Rihab Taha consistently failed to report in full all the sites and items that needed to be reported, the baseline inspections of Iraq's biological capabilities became a complete muddle.' [2]

[1] *Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq's Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)*, UN document S/1994/489 of 22 April 1994; [no author listed] (from Manama, in English), Agence France Presse, 2010 GMT 17 April 1994; Leon Barkho (from Baghdad), Reuters, 20 April 1994.

[2] Tim Trevan, *Saddam's Secrets: The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons*, London: HarperCollins, 1999, pp 261–62.

**18–22 April 1994** In Iraq the fifteenth UN chemical inspection team, UNSCOM 74, led by Horst Reeps of Germany and numbering 7 people, interviews senior Iraqi officials in order to verify information about Iraq's past chemical-weapons programme given during the recent round of high-level talks [see 14–19 March]. The team is also given new documentation about the programme.[1]

The subsequent UNSCOM six-monthly progress report describes the work of UNSCOM 74 as a 'major breakthrough', for the team was given 'a hand-written list of the letters of credit authorized for the import of items in support of the chemical weapons programme', Iraq claiming that 'the list covers its entire procurement activities'. The report continues: 'Verification of the newly revealed Iraqi procurement data is complicated by the sometimes overly generalized descriptions of procured items associated with each letter of credit. Also complicating the assessment of this new data is the difficulty of obtaining corroborating information from the alleged supplier Governments. The Commission

continues to pursue vigorously its efforts to refine and verify this new, and potentially valuable, information'. An inspection planned for the second half of October will take the matter further.[2]

[1] [no author listed] (from Manama, in English), 'UN chemical weapons experts to interview Iraqi officials', Agence France Presse, 2010 GMT 17 April 1994; Randall Palmer (from Manama), 'UN activity in Iraq speeds up as two teams go in', Reuter, 0446 GMT 18 April 1994; [no author listed] (from Manama, in English), 'UN chemical, nuclear experts end missions to Iraq', Agence France Presse, 2317 GMT 22 April 1994; Tim Trevan in *SIPRI Yearbook 1995*, p 752.

[2] *Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq's Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)*, UN document S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994.

**22 April 1994** The UN Secretary-General submits to the Security Council a fifth 6-monthly report on implementation of the UNSCOM plan for ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq, as required by Security Council resolution 715 (1991). Now that Iraq has formally accepted the latter resolution [see 26 November 1993], the report is considerably fuller than its predecessors, detailing preparatory activities that have been initiated for implementing the OMV plan [see 14–19 March].

The report states that Iraq has declared a total production of CW agents of 4340.5 tons. The latest Iraqi declaration of total traceable imported precursor chemicals is 17 657 tons.[1]

[1] *Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq's Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)*, UN document S/1994/489, 22 April 1994.

**24–26 April 1994** In Iraq, UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekéus has high-level talks with Iraqi officials during which it is agreed to accelerate the process of establishing the on-going monitoring and verification regime. Speaking to reporters after the talks, Chairman Ekéus says that Iraq had provided some very important information about its chemical weapons programme, although more was still needed in order to operate the OMV plan.[1]

[1] [no author listed] (from Nicosia), 'UN disarmament chief meets Iraqi officials', Agence France Presse, 2145 GMT 24 April 1994; [no author listed] (from Baghdad), 'UNSCOM, Iraq to accelerate setting up monitoring system on weapons', Xinhua, item 0426214, 26 April 1994.

**17 May 1994** The UN Security Council meets for its regular 60-day review of the sanctions against Iraq [see 19 March] amidst some pressure for their relaxation.[1] The sanctions are to remain in place.

[1] Patrick Bishop, *Daily Telegraph* (London), 'Calls grow to end Iraqi sanctions', 4 May 1994, p 15; Ian Black, 'Britain and US counter UN move to ease Iraqi oil ban', *Guardian* (London), 17 May 1994, p 12.

**25 May 1994** In the US Senate, the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs conducts a hearing on US export policy in relation to shipments of CBW-related materials to Iraq by US companies prior to the Kuwait War.[1] Chairman Donald Riegle has called the hearing both to review export-control policies under

the Export Administration Act and as part of his continuing investigation into the disputed ‘Gulf War Syndrome’ [see 9 February]. He releases a lengthy staff report[2] which presents evidence showing it to have been theoretically possible for there to have been widespread exposure among US forces in the Gulf area to low levels of CW agents, and perhaps even BW agents as well. The Committee hears testimony from Defense Department, DIA and CIA witnesses,[3] who are aggressively questioned on, among other matters, the performance of the CBW-agent detection and alarm systems that had been deployed in the Kuwait War theatre.[4]

Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) Edwin Dorn speaks of the efforts being made on behalf of Kuwait War veterans by his Department and the Department of Veterans Affairs. He says: ‘DoD and VA doctors have treated thousands of Persian Gulf veterans for readily identifiable illnesses and injuries; but we know of about 2,000 people for whom a clear diagnosis continues to elude physicians.’ He also says: ‘We have concluded that Iraq did not use chemical or biological weapons during the war’.[5]

The Director of the Nonproliferation Center at the CIA, Dr Gordon Oehler, testifies on the US intelligence community’s assessments of Iraqi CBW capabilities prior to the Kuwait War, on the means whereby Iraq acquired its Chemical weapons and other mass-destruction weapons technologies, and on the part played by US intelligence agencies in efforts to restrict CBW-related technology transfers to Iraq. In the course of his testimony he says that, by early 1990, US intelligence had calculated that the Iraqi CW-weapons production facility at Al-Muthanna was capable of producing more than 2000 tons per year of blister and nerve agents. Also: ‘With regard to biological weapons, we estimated, prior to the start of the war, that Iraq had a stockpile of at least one metric ton of biological warfare agents, including anthrax and botulinum toxin.’[6] During exchanges with members of the Committee, Dr Oehler states that the CIA had had real-time knowledge of Iraq’s procurement efforts for chemical weapons as they gradually developed throughout the 1980s.[7] He says, too, that Iraq had been purchasing CW-agent precursors from a Dutch dealer even in the 1970s.

[1] 103rd US Congress, 2nd Session, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, hearing, *United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and their Impact on the Health of the Persian Gulf War Veterans*, S. HRG. 103-900, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1994.

[2] Donald W Riegle, Jr, and Alfonse M D’Amato, *US chemical and biological warfare-related dual use exports to Iraq and their possible impact on the health consequences of the Persian Gulfwar*, 25 May 1994

[3] David Brown, ‘Report blames ‘Gulf War Syndrome’ on chemical attacks’, *Washington Post*, 26 May 1994, p A4; Associated Press from Washington, as in ‘Iraq used toxic arms in war, report says’, *International Herald Tribune*, 26 May 1994, pp 1 & 5.

[4] 103rd US Congress, 2nd Session, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, hearing, *United States dual-use exports to Iraq and their impact on the health of the Persian Gulf War veterans*, 25 May 1994, S.HRG. 103-900, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1994.

[5] Prepared statement of Edwin Dorn, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 25 May 1994; Lois Ember, *Chemical & Engineering News*, 30 May 1994, p 6, ‘Gulf troop exposure to chemical arms charged’.

[6] Prepared statement of Gordon C Oehler (Director, Nonproliferation Center, CIA) before the Senate Banking Committee, 25 May 1994.

[7] S.HRG 103-900, p 75.

**25 May–5 June 1994** In Iraq the sixteenth UN chemical inspection team, UNSCOM 75, led by Rod Godfrey of the United Kingdom and numbering 10 people,[1] conducts the first series of baseline inspections for the CW part of the future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification System. The team generates protocols for 14 of the sites in Iraq known to have been associated with past chemical-weapons programmes or otherwise to have dual-purpose capabilities of specific concern for the OMV System. The protocols include data on the layout of each site, the chemical processes used, precursors utilized, and waste materials produced. The team makes recommendations on the frequency with which OMV inspections should be conducted at each site. It refines the baseline-data requirements which UNSCOM 67 had established [see 1–11 February].[2]

[1] Abbas Salman (from Manama), ‘More UN inspection teams visit Baghdad’, Reuter, 23 May 1994.

[2] *Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq’s Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)*, UN document S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994.

**28 May–7 June 1994** In Iraq the fifth UN biological inspection team, UNSCOM 78, led by Dave Franz of the United States and numbering 10 people, continues ‘the assessment of the biological capability and [begins] construction of an inventory of equipment that can be used for legitimate purposes or for offensive biological purposes, whether it be research, development or production’, as the team leader puts it to reporters upon arrival. The basic purpose is to develop the technical baseline for UNSCOM’s ongoing monitoring and verification in the biological field.[1] Upon departure, Chief Inspector Franz tells reporters that everything had gone smoothly and that a new UNSCOM team will be visiting in order to complete the tagging operation.[2] The team had visited some 31 sites, at which 330 pieces of equipment were identified, described in detail, tagged and photographed.[3] Chief Inspector Franz later publishes some detailed observations, as does one of his inspectors, Raymond Zilinskas of the USA.[4]

[1] [no author listed] (from Manama), ‘UN biological team goes to Iraq on Saturday’, Reuter, 27 May 1994; [no author listed] (from Manama), ‘UN biological team heads for Baghdad’, Reuter, 28 May 1994.

[2] [no author listed] (from Baghdad), ‘UN germ warfare team says Iraq mission went well’, Reuter, 7 June 1994.

[3] *Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq’s Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)*, UN document S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994.

[4] Raymond A Zilinskas, ‘UNSCOM and the UNSCOM experience in Iraq’, *Politics and the Life Sciences* vol 14 no 2 (August 1995), pp 230-235; David R Franz, ‘Inventory control of dual-use equipment’, *Politics and the Life Sciences* vol 14 no 2 (August 1995), pp 244-247.

**31 May–14 June 1994** In Iraq, the activities of the UNSCOM Chemical Destruction Group [see 23 June 1992, 17 December 1991, 14 February 1992, 29 April

1993 and 18 August 1993] at Al Muthanna are brought to a conclusion by UNSCOM 76 and UNSCOM 77 — the 17th and 18th UN chemical inspection teams, respectively, led by Richard Soilleux of the United Kingdom and Jurgen Mihm of Germany.[1] The aims of these two final inspections have been to confirm that the destruction of declared CW agents, their precursors and certain production equipment at Muthanna is now complete, and that those areas of the site used for the chemdemil operations retain no significant level of chemical contamination.[2] A protocol describing UNSCOM actions at Muthanna and future Iraqi obligations with respect to the site is signed by representatives of Iraq and UNSCOM.[3]

[1] [no author listed], ‘UN completes Iraqi gas destruction’, *Washington Times*, 1 June 1994, p A12; Leon Barkho (from Baghdad), ‘UN says work in Iraq’s Muthana coming to end’, Reuters, 9 June 1994; [no author listed] (from Manama), ‘UN to shut Iraq chemical destruction operation’, Reuters, 8 June 1994; UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, *Notes on Security and Arms Control*, 1994 no 5, June 1994.

[2] UN press release IK/171, 22 June 1994, ‘United Nations Special Commission completes destruction of declared chemical weapons stocks in Iraq’.

[3] *Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq’s Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)*, UN document S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994.

**3 June 1994** In Texas, 26 US Kuwait War veterans file a billion-dollar class-action lawsuit against 11 chemical companies claiming injuries caused by CBW weapons made from products supposedly sold by the companies to Iraq prior to the Kuwait war [see 25 May]. The veterans are suffering from the putative ‘Gulf War syndrome’. Their lawyers say that more plaintiffs, and defendants, may later be added to the suit.[1] The US district court in Galveston, to which the case is moved, sets a pre-trial hearing date of 2 November for the case.[2]

[1] [no author listed] (from Houston), Reuters, as in: ‘Gulf War veterans sue firms over toxic injuries’, *Boston Globe*, 9 June 1994, p 17; [no author listed], ‘Vets sue companies for selling precursors to chemical arms’, *Chemical & Engineering News*, 20 June 1994, p 21.

[2] John Hendren, ‘11 firms sued over war ills’, *Record* (Bergen, NJ), 20 July 1994, p D1.

**5–8 June 1994** In Iraq a UN biological team, UNSCOM 86/BW7, is in Baghdad to conduct technical talks with Iraqi authorities for the purpose of clarifying inconsistencies and anomalies in declarations made by Iraq on biological matters in January and April. Iraq is asked to provide supplementary information on 24 sites with biological activities and capabilities. Discussions focus on university laboratories, production facilities, breweries, import facilities and factories for the manufacture in Iraq of equipment that could be used in BW-agent production.[1]

[1] *Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq’s Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)*, UN document S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994.

**6 June 1994** The US Administration transmits to the Congress its statutory status report on Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. The general tenor

of the report is that it is far too soon for the international community to lift the sanctions on Iraq. Included in the report is the following: ‘We are seriously concerned about the many contradictions and unanswered questions remaining in regard to Iraq’s WMD [weapons of mass destruction] capability, especially in the chemical weapons area. The Secretary-General’s report of April 22 [q.v.] has detailed how the Iraqi government has stalled, obstructed, and impeded the Special Commission in its essential efforts. This report indicated that information supplied by Iraq on its missile and chemical programs was incomplete.’[1]

[1] President Clinton, letter dated 6 June 1994 addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Tempore of the Senate regarding the report to Congress on Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council resolutions, text as distributed by *US Newswire*, 8 June 1994.

**13 June 1994** In Baghdad, documents are signed at a meeting of representatives of UNSCOM and Iraq whereby responsibility for the Muthanna chemical-weapons site [see 31 May–14 June] is formally returned to Iraqi authorities. In addition to operations at the special chemdemil facilities which UNSCOM had established at the site, now finished, the main production plant there had been blown up by UNSCOM experts, and the bomb-damaged storage facility holding thousands of chemical mortar and artillery projectiles had been filled with concrete.[1]

[1] [no author listed] (from Manama), Reuter, as in ‘Iraqi complex dismantled’, *Washington Post*, 15 June 1994, p A29; UN press release IK/171, 22 June 1994, ‘United Nations Special Commission completes destruction of declared chemical weapons stocks in Iraq’.

**14 June 1994** The UK House of Commons releases the report of the inquiry of its all-party Defence Committee into the implementation of lessons learned from UK participation in the Kuwait War, Operation Granby.[1] The report reproduces, with security deletions, what appears to be the CBW chapter of the official *The Gulf Conflict— the Lessons Learned* and also minutes of evidence on CBW taken from officials by the committee in private session [see 24 November 1993], as well as written official responses to questions arising.

The committee report itself, which *inter alia* concludes that British forces went into the Gulf inadequately prepared to survive CBW attack, occasionally departs somewhat from the evidence on which it is based. It says, for example, that Iraq ‘had the capability to manufacture and use biological weapons including anthrax and botulinum toxin’ — even though on BW the Ministry of Defence Director Defence Policy, Margaret Aldred, had spoken to the committee as follows: ‘We knew that they had a programme. We did not know what their intentions were. We did not have, and we do not have, any information about whether or not they have weaponised biological agents [see also 25 May]. We know they have weaponised chemical agents, but we do not know whether they had biological weapons or how they would use them, but we recognised that it was a risk.’

Commenting on the report’s portrayal of insufficient British CBW preparedness, Brigadier John Hemsley writes: ‘The Ministry of Defence is partly to blame through its imposition of excessive and unnecessary

secrecy on all aspects of the subject. Is this designed to camouflage ineptitude or protect politicians? Perhaps the Defence Committee should investigate this aspect.’[2]

[1] UK House of Commons, Defence Committee, Fifth Report, *Implementation of Lessons Learned from Operation Granby*, HC papers (session 1993-94) 43, ordered to be published 25 May 1994.

[2] John Hemsley, letter to the editor, *Daily Telegraph* (London), 17 June 1994, p 20.

**16 June 1994** In Bahrain, the UNSCOM Chemical Destruction Group [see 31 May–14 June] is finally disbanded after its two years of operations in Iraq. According to a UN press release, the Group had engaged about a hundred experts from 23 countries, and had destroyed over 480 kilolitres of mustard gas, tabun and sarin, over 28,000 of Iraq’s CW munitions, and ‘nearly 1.8 million litres, over 1,040,000 kilograms and 648 barrels of some 45 different precursor chemicals for the production of chemical warfare agents’.[1]

[1] UN press release IK/171, 22 June 1994, ‘United Nations Special Commission completes destruction of declared chemical weapons stocks in Iraq’.

**24 June–5 July 1994** In Iraq the sixth UN biological inspection team, UNSCOM 84,[1] led by Jeff Mohr of the United States and numbering 32 people installs surveillance equipment at some 18 different sites around the country where there are dual-use biological facilities. This is part of the UNSCOM ongoing monitoring and verification effort [see 28 May–7 June].[2] The team has had the task of conducting initial inspections at an additional 35 biological sites in preparation, if necessary, for OMV protocol building. So the objective has been to assess activities at the sites and to identify the equipment present in order to determine whether the sites should or should not be subject to declaration and hence to OMV procedures. Iraq is again [see 5-8 June] asked to provide missing information and clarification of earlier declarations. The team concludes that eight of the undeclared sites visited required monitoring because of the presence at the sites of items or activities subject to declaration.[3] Chief Inspector Mohr later publishes a detailed account of the mission, which had included a ‘no notice inspection’ at Salman Pak during which a field had been excavated, against Iraqi objections, in a search for buried biological agents and munitions.[4]

[1] UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, *Notes on Security and Arms Control*, 1994 no 5, June 1994.

[2] [no author listed] (from Baghdad), ‘UN experts arrive for monitoring Iraq’s biological field’, *Xinhua*, 24 June 1994, item 0624137.

[3] *Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq’s Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)*, UN document S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994.

[4] Alan J Mohr, ‘Biological sampling and analysis procedures for the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq’, *Politics and the Life Sciences* vol 14 no 2 (August 1995), pp 240-243.

**28 June 1994** In the UK House of Commons the government responds to a question about the possibility of British armed forces personnel having become exposed to CW agents during the Kuwait War as a result of the bombing of targets in Iraq. The Director General of CBDE Porton Down, Dr Graham Pearson, had

provided the response, quoting an assessment which CBDE had made at the time of the potential downwind hazard distances from bombed chemical-weapon storage sites: ‘The result of the assessment indicated that even assuming simultaneous release of the majority of agent from several bunkers under meteorological conditions which favoured the downwind travel of the agent cloud and ignoring the fact that chemical agents are organic materials which are destroyed by combustion, the maximum distance at which there would be any hazard was of the order of a few tens of kilometres... The conclusion was that there was no evidence that British Servicemen and women would be exposed to chemical warfare agent as a result of bombing attacks.’[1]

[1] *Hansard* (Commons) vol 245 no 123 cols 498-9, written answers 28 June 1994, Mr Hanley for the Secretary of State for Defence to Mr Llew Smith.

**29 June 1994** In New York, the UN Security Council is briefed on progress in the startup of UNSCOM’s long-term verification work in Iraq. UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekéus, who will shortly be visiting Baghdad, later tells reporters that the ‘Iraqi side is doing a good job and [has] established a positive attitude in putting the monitoring system in place’ [see also 6 June]. The protocols for on-going monitoring and verification in the CBW field are being developed [see 24 June–5 July] in a first-phase activity which Chairman Ekéus tells the Security Council will not be completed until September. The second phase, expected to last about six months, will test the programme.[1]

[1] Reuters (from UN New York), 29 June 1994, ‘New date on Iraqi inspections is September’.