15 years ago:

6 March 2003     At UN headquarters, UNMOVIC completes a working draft of the document Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq's Proscribed Weapons Programmes,[1] described by UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix as a "working document with the complete clusters of disarmament issues".[2] It rapidly becomes commonly known as the "cluster document". Although Security Council resolution 1284 [see 17 December 1999] only requires UNMOVIC to submit its work programme to the Security Council, Blix decides to declassify this document and make it available to Council members on request. It is posted on UNMOVIC's website five days later.
     The 175-page report takes as its starting point the final report produced by UNSCOM [see 25 January 1999] and the "Amorim panel" report on disarmament aspects of UN-Iraq relations [see 27 March 1999]. However, the report also utilizes material from UNMOVIC's archive such as Iraqi full, final and complete declarations. This has been supplemented by information acquired in the years since, including material from the backlog of semi-annual declarations transmitted by Iraq in October 2002, from the declaration presented by Iraq [see 7 December 2002] as required by resolution 1441 [see 8 November 2002], from suppliers, from documents provided by Iraq since the resumption of inspections, from inspection reports by UNMOVIC, from open sources and from overhead imagery and intelligence reports.
     After a description of the factors which have shaped Iraq's policies on weapons of mass destruction and a summary of developments from December 1998 until the present, the report categorizes the unresolved disarmament tasks into 29 clusters and presents them by discipline: missiles; munitions; chemical; and biological. As well as providing UNMOVIC's assessment of each cluster, the report also contains suggestions as to how Iraq could resolve the issues. Finally, appended to the report is a historical account of Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes.
     The report is used by both sides in the current deliberations within the Security Council to justify their respective positions.[3]
     [1] UNMOVIC, "Unresolved disarmament issues: Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes", 6 March 2003.
     [2] Hans Blix, UNMOVIC Executive Chairman, presentation to the UN Security Council, 7 March 2003, as reported in UN document S/PV.4714, dated 7 March 2003, p 5.
     [3] Mark Turner and Guy Dinmore (from New York), "Complex Blix report gives hope to both sides in UN", Financial Times, 8-9 March 2003, p 10.

20 years ago:

24 March 1998     In Iraq, the scientist Nassir al-Hindawi, described as "the father of Baghdad's germ weapons program", has been arrested while preparing to leave the country, according to unidentified Western officials quoted in the New York Times. Dr Hindawi had written a secret report in 1983 suggesting how the country's small and ailing BW programme might be turned into a major military asset, so UNSCOM officials have said, and, according to Iraqi officials sometime previously, he had been managing director during 1989-91 of the now-destroyed facility at al-Hakam [see 20 June 1996]. The Times also reports that it had been told by Ambassador Nizar Hamdoon, Iraq's UN representative, that his government had, on 9 March, informed UNSCOM of the arrest, turning over to it papers on the BW programme that had been found in Dr Hindawi's possession.[1] UNSCOM spokesman Ewen Buchanan later confirms that this was so, but adds that Dr Hindawi "was not involved in the production phase" of the programme.[2] General al-Saadi [see 20-27 March] tells the Vienna Standard that Iraqi authorities had been suspicious of Dr Hindawi for some time because, when questioned by UNSCOM, as he often had been, he could "remember" details that nobody else knew any more.[3] To the Zurich Tages-Anzeiger, he says that Dr Hindawi "wanted to retire as a rich man, outside Iraq" and was now "in prison for an illegal deal", also saying: "He resigned from the weapons programme in 1989, but remained head of the civilian programme, which deals with the production of pesticides, fertilizers and proteins. The CIA is after the Iraqi scientists so that it can keep the biological weapons file open."[4] Unidentified people, some of them said to represent the Iraqi opposition in exile, are quoted as attributing the arrest of Dr Hindawi to a CIA exfiltration operation that had gone wrong.[5]
     [1] Judith Miller, "Baghdad arrests a germ specialist", New York Times, 24 March 1998, pp A1 & A11.
     [2] [no author listed] (from UN New York), "UNSCOM plays down Iraq germ warfare arrest", Agence France Press, 24 March 1998; Jason Bennetto, Colin Brown and David Usborne, "Ministers in "Doomsday" exercise after anthrax alert", Independent (London), 25 March 1998, p 1; R Jeffrey Smith (from New York), "Iraq jails germ warfare scientist it says wanted to leave with documents", Washington Post, 25 March 1998, p A27; [no author listed] (from Tehran), "UN Welcomes Iraqi's Offer to Interview Germ Expert", Xinhua News Agency, 25 March 1998, ref 0325022.
     [3] Gudrun Harrer, Der Standard (Vienna), 1 April 1998, p 6, "[The CIA is after our experts]", as translated from the German in FBIS-NES-98-091, 1 April 1998.
     [3] Tages-Anzeiger (Zurich), 28 March 1998, as reported in: "Swiss paper interviews Iraqi weapons official; says UN free to question Hindawi", BBC-SWB, 1 April 1998, part 4, ME/D3190/MED.
     [4] Julian Borger, "CIA accused of bungling Iraq escape", Guardian (London), 26 March 1998, p 13; [no author listed], "Proliferation: secret Baghdad-Washington-Tehran fight", Intelligence Newsletter, 2 April 1998, pp 6-7.

25 years ago:

22 March 1993     In the US Senate, Senator John McCain introduces reports on Iraq's nuclear and chemical weapons programmes which he had commissioned from the Congressional Research Service some months previously [see 24 February] - the report on biological weapons is not yet ready. He comments on the contributions which American, European and Indian corporations had made to the Iraqi CW programme, and says that international arms control efforts alone cannot be relied upon to stop the spread of mass-destruction technologies. He continues: "We need to use the full power of the American economy to confront supplier countries and companies with powerful sanctions in terms of a loss of access to American market".[1]
     [1] Congressional Record (daily edition), 22 March 1993, pp S3380-1.

30 years ago:

16 March 1988     Kurdish areas of Iraq are attacked with chemical weapons "on a massive scale", Iranian sources claim.[1] In particular, the towns of Halabja and Dojaila are attacked with chemical weapons "killing many defenceless residents", so IRNA reports.[2] The towns are currently on the front line of the Iran–Iraq War. Initial information suggests "some 4000 residents ... killed",[3] although it is not clear if this is meant to be the figure for Halabja only or for Halabja, Dojaila and the neighbouring community of Khormal together. Later Iran says the chemical weapons casualties in and around Halabja during 16–18 March total 12 500,[4] including more than 5500 dead.[5] Later research shows the number to be, at minuimum, in excess of 3200.[6]
     It later becomes clear that these attacks are carried out in parallel with a wider campaign known as "Anfal".[7] Tehran Radio claims that Iraq had resorted to using chemical weapons as it was "totally disappointed because of repeated defeats".[8]
     Accounts of both survivors and Iranian officials indicate that Iraqi warplanes bomb the town with a combination of conventional and chemical weapons during 16 and 17 March, with the Iraqi soldiers of the Halabja garrison having surrendered to Kurdish irregular forces the day before. Iranian soldiers enter Halabja not long before Iraqi aircraft begin bombing with chemical weapons. The Iranian soldiers have access to protective equipment, meaning many survive the chemical weapons attack. Iranian doctors, treating hundreds of survivors, said the cloud contained a mixture of mustard gas and cyanide gas, with unknown nerve agents mixed in as well. The injured suffered from chemical burns from the mustard gas on their skin, eyes and lungs.[9]
     Further reports suggest chemical weapons are also deployed from systems other than aircraft. Iranian Revolutionary Guards spokesman Ali Shafii is quoted as saying "Iraqis, using planes and artillery equipped with chemical weapons releasing mustard gas, cyanide and other types, caused 5000 innocent people of Halabja and the area to die".[10]
     Some eight months later, a senior member of the Iraqi Government, Vice President Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma'ruf, admits Iraqi use of chemical weapons at Halabja.[11]
     [1] Letter dated 17 March 1988 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN document S/19639, 17 March 1988.
     [2] Martin Marris (from Nicosia), "Iraqi Missile Strikes Tehran, Iran Says it Seized Two Border Towns", Associated Press, 17 March 1988.
     [3] IRNA, 1800 GMT 17 March 1988, as reported in "Iranian Military Communiqués and Reports", BBC-SWB, 23 March 1988, ME/0107/A/1; Letter dated 18 March 1988 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN document S/19647, 18 March 1988
     [4] Letter Dated 11 April 1988 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran Addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament, Conference on Disarmament Document CD/827, 12 April 1988.
     [5] Speech by the representative of Iran to the Conference on Disarmament, Mr Mashhadi, as reported in CD document CD/PV.450, 22 March 1988.
     [6] A total of 3200 names of individuals killed was collected in the course of systematic interviews with survivors by researcher Shorsh Resool, as reported in: Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds (Yale University Press, 1995).
     [7] Dlawer Abdul Aziz Ala'Aldeen, Death Clouds: Saddam Hussein's Chemical War Against the Kurds, January 1991; Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds (Yale University Press, 1995).
     [8] Tehran radio, 17 March 1988, as reported in "Gulf war Iran "Liberates" more towns; Khomeyni comments on missile attacks", BBC-SWB, 18 March 1988, ME/0103/i.
     [9] "Iraqi Poison Gas Attack Kills Kurds in Iraqi Town; Town Bombed After Capture by Iran", Facts on File, 1 April 1988, p. 215, F2.
     [10] Andrew Bilski, "Under a cloud of death", Maclean's, 4 April 1988, p.18.
     [11] Statement of Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma'ruf, Vice President of Iraq, at a press luncheon in Paris, as reported in Le Monde, 10 November 1988, p 12.

50 years ago:

13 March 1968     In the United States, an F-4 Phantom strike aircraft flies a test mission over the Dugway Proving Ground with chemical dispensers containing VX. One of the dispensers isn't completely emptied during the test, and an outlet valve remains jammed open. A VX cloud forms in a trail behind the aircraft, drifting into Skull Valley, north of the proving ground, and settling over a huge flock of sheep. Thousands of sheep die as a consequence in the following days. The cloud is said to travel over halfway to Salt Lake City, some 80 miles (130 km) away and is only dispersed by a rain shower. The DoD denies responsibility for over a year.[1]
     [1] Roy Reed (from Washington), "Gas or germ tests in air are scored", New York Times, 21 May 1969; Stephen Barber (from Washington), "Official U.S. Map "Proof" of Gas and Germ War Tests", Daily Telegraph (London), 22 May 1969; Seymour Hersh, "On Uncovering the Great Nerve Gas Coverup", Ramparts, June 1969, pp 13–18; Sterling Seagrave, Yellow Rain: a journey through the terror of chemical warfare, New York: M. Evans and Company, Inc., 1981, p 109; Final Environmental Impact Statement for Activities Associated with Future Programs at U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Volume II, August 31, 2004, pp I-16-17.