20 years ago:

14 August 1998     The Washington Post reports that the US administration has sometimes intervened to dissuade UNSCOM from mounting particular no-notice inspections in Iraq, and had done so most recently on 4 August in regard to inspections planned for 6 August.[1] The newspaper suggests that this was because the administration wished to avoid a new crisis over Iraq. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright confirms that such intervention had indeed taken place,[2] but, as the Washington Post later puts it, she explains its purpose as being "to control the pace of confrontation with Iraq to create the best conditions in which to prevail".[3] The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Senator Sam Brownback, announces his intention of conducting a hearing on the matter as soon as the Congress reconvenes.[4]
     The newspaper later itemizes six occasions of US intervention, back to 22 November 1997. It also reports that, in March, "the United States and Britain withdrew crucial elements of the intelligence support that allowed [UNSCOM] to observe Iraqi concealment efforts as they happened during surprise inspections", the withdrawal "including information, equipment and personnel".[5] Attributing unidentified US officials, US News & World Report later locates the shift of policy to "a Spring re-examination of the inspections crisis that ended when [UN Secretary-General] Annan brokered a deal requiring that diplomats chaperone inspectors to Iraqi presidential sites [see 20 February]".[6]
     [1] Barton Gellman, "US sought to prevent Iraqi arms inspections", Washington Post, 14 August 1998, p A1
     [2] Madeleine K Albright, "The US will stand firm on Iraq, no matter what" [op-ed], New York Times, 17 August 1998.
     [3] Barton Gellman, "US tried to halt several searches", Washington Post, 27 August 1998, p A1.
     [4] [no author listed] (from Washington), "US Senate panel will ask about Iraq policy", Reuter, 19 August 1998.
     [5] Barton Gellman, "US tried to halt several searches", Washington Post, 27 August 1998, p A1.
     [6] Thomas Omestad and Linda Fasulo, "Sounding retreat on Saddam Hussein?", US News & World Report, 7 September 1998, p 18.

26 August 1998     In New York, UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter [see 5–10 March] resigns from the staff of UNSCOM after six years of service. He releases his letter of resignation, in which he is sharply critical of the US government, the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary-General for their failure to act more forthrightly against Iraq.[1] The core of the letter is as follows:

     Iraq has lied to the Special Commission and the world since Day One concerning the true scope and nature of its proscribed programs and weapons systems. This lie has been perpetuated over the years through systematic acts of concealment. It was for the purpose of uncovering Iraq's mechanism of concealment, and in doing so gaining access to the hidden weapons, components and weapons programs, that you created a dedicated capability to investigate Iraq's concealment activities, which I have had the privilege to head. During the period of time that this effort has been underway, the Commission has uncovered indisputable proof of a systematic concealment mechanism, run by the Presidency of Iraq and protected by the Presidential security forces.

     This investigation has led the Commission to the door step of Iraq's hidden retained capability, and yet the Commission has been frustrated by Iraq's continued refusal to abide by its obligations under Security Council resolutions and the Memorandum of Understanding of 23 February 1998 to allow inspections, the Security Council's refusal to effectively respond to Iraq's actions, and now the current decision by the Security Council and the Secretary General, backed at least implicitly by the United States, to seek a "diplomatic" alternative to inspection-driven confrontation with Iraq, a decision which constitutes a surrender to the Iraqi leadership that has succeeded in thwarting the stated will of the United Nations.

     Inspections do work — too well, in fact, prompting Iraq to shut them down all together. Almost without exception, every one of the impressive gains made by UNSCOM over the years in disarming Iraq can be traced to the effectiveness of the inspection regime implemented by the Special Commission. The issue of immediate, unrestricted access is, in my opinion, the cornerstone of any viable inspection regime, and as such is an issue worth fighting for. Unfortunately, others do not share this opinion, including the Security Council and the United States. The Special Commission of today, hobbled as it is by unfettered Iraqi obstruction and non-existent Security Council enforcement of its own resolutions, is not the organization I joined almost seven years ago.

At a press briefing next day, UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler says that the letter of resignation, which he had accepted, expressed the strongly held views of a man of integrity — views on which, however, he declines to comment.[2]
     The Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, writes to President Clinton saying that the resignation raised "disturbing questions' and suggested that "your Administration's tough rhetoric on Iraq has been a deception masking a real policy of weakness and concession".[3]
     [1] Barton Gellman, "Inspector quits UN team, says Council bowing to defiant Iraq", Washington Post, 27 August 1998, p A1; Judith Miller, "American inspector on Iraq quits, accusing UN and US of cave-in", New York Times, 27 August 1998, p A1; David Usborne (from New York), "Resignation casts doubt on inspections in Iraq", Independent (London), 28 August 1998, p 9. See also: Jim Hoagland, "Ritter's resignation", Washington Post, 27 August 1998, p A21; A M Rosenthal, "On my mind: Scott Ritter's decision", New York Times, 28 August 1998, p A25; Jonathan B Tucker, "Ritter's resignation is a wake-up call", Los Angeles Times, 30 August 1998.
     [2] UN Dept of Public Information, "Press briefing by UNSCOM Executive Chairman", 27 August 1998.
     [3] Judith Miller (from Washington), "Gingrich questions Clinton's policy on Iraqi arms inspection', New York Times, 29 August 1998, p A5.

30 years ago:

1 August 1988     The reports of the UN chemical weapons investigatory mission to Iran [see 8 July] and Iraq [see 13 July] are finally published. Desire not to inhibit the incipient Iran–Iraq peace talks is widely supposed to have caused the publication delay.[1] Another theory is alleged Iraqi influence on the Arabic translation service of the UN.[2]
     Iranian Permanent Representative to the UN Mohammad Mahallati describes the report as "positive". He says that since the adoption of resolution 612 [see 9 May], Iraq has three times made vast use of chemical weapons.[3]
     The Associated Press wire story on the reports, much relied upon by English-language newspapers around the world, erroneously states that the reports "accused both Iraq and Iran of using chemical weapons".[4]
     [1] Jane Rosen (from New York), "US hints at Gulf role for Moscow", Guardian (London), 28 July 1988, p 1.
     [2] Leonard Doyle (from New York), "Iraqis suppress gas war report", Independent (London), 29 July 1988, p 1.
     [3] [no author listed] (from UN New York), "UN Chief Anxious about Use of Chemical Weapons against Iran", Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 1 August 1988 ref 0801176.
     [4] [no author listed] (from UN New York) as in Associated Press, "UN cites "intensive" use of poison gas by Iraq, but also accuses Iran", International Herald Tribune, 2 August 1988, p 2.

2 August 1988     Iraqi aircraft drop chemical weapons on four locations in Oshnaviyeh district south of Orumiyeh in western Azerbaijan province during the morning, so IRNA reports, claiming the attacks wound "several" local people.[1] The agency says that at least 1031 people have been injured from the attack, mostly with minor injuries.[2] Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati states that the attack occurred at 0245 local time, "when the innocent and unsuspecting inhabitants of Oshnaviyeh were asleep" and that the eight bombs dropped on Oshnaviyeh contained mustard gas.[3] Very soon the casualty tally rises to 1700,[4] of which 100 are reported to be seriously affected.[5] Within a week the casualty toll is given by a local official as 2265, of which 260 are said to be hospitalized.[6]
     Overall, Iranian authorities claim that 2680 casualties result from the attack, of which 910 require hospital treatment.[7]
     [1] [no author listed] (from Tehran), "Iran Accuses Iraq of Using More Chemical Weapons", Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 2 August 1988 ref 0802259.
     [2] Neil MacFarquhar, "Iran Reports Iraqi Air Raids; Ship Explodes in Gulf", Associated Press, 3 August 1988.
     [3] Victoria Graham (from UN New York), "Military Team Presents Report; Iran Asks Condemnation of Alleged Attack", Associated Press, 4 August 1988.
     [4] Neil MacFarquhar (from Nicosia), "Iran Says Iraqi Chemical Attack Injured 1,700", Associated Press, 4 August 1988.
     [5] IRNA (in English), 0810 GMT 4 August 1988, as reported in "Oshnoviyeh Casualty Toll Rises", FBIS (LD0408084288), FBIS-NES-88-150, 4 August 1988, p. 54.
     [6] IRNA (in English), 1737 GMT 6 August 1988, as reported in "Foreign Journalists View Victims of Toxic Gas", FBIS (LD0608182388), FBIS-NES-88-154, 10 August 1988, p. 58.
     [7] Report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, as annexed to UN document S/20134 dated 19 August 1988.

35 years ago:

18 August 1983     In New York, the Iranian UN Representative, Said Rajaie Khorassani, writes to the UN Secretary-General. The main thrust of his letter is to complain that Iraq has been attacking civilians, but he includes the line: "Furthermore, the ruling regime of the Baathist Party of Iraq, in contravention of international norms, dropped chemical bombs in the operational theatre of Val Fajr-2."[1]
     [Note: This appears to be the first occasion on which Iran presents to the United Nations an allegation of Iraqi chemical weapons use.]
     [1] Letter dated 18 August 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, as reproduced in UN document S/15934, dated 18 August 1983.

50 years ago:

6 August 1968     In Geneva, the United Kingdom submits to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) a "Working Paper on Microbiological Warfare".[1] The paper is presented in person by British Foreign Office Minister of State Fred Mulley. The paper includes:

     The United Kingdom Delegation consider that the 1925 Geneva Protocol is not an entirely satisfactory instrument for dealing with the question of chemical and microbial warfare. The following points may be noted:

     (i) Many states are not parties to the Protocol and of those that are parties many, including the United Kingdom, have reserved the right to use chemical and bacteriological weapons against non-parties, violators of the Protocol and their allies.

     (ii) Jurists are not agreed whether the Protocol represents customary international law or whether it is of a purely contractual nature.

     (iii) Even if all states were to accede to the Protocol there would still be a risk of large-scale use of the proscribed weapons as long as states have the right to manufacture such weapons and to use them against violators and their allies.

     (v) The term "bacteriological" as used in the Protocol is not sufficiently comprehensive to include the whole range of microbial agents that might be used in hostilities.

     (vi) The prohibition in the Protocol applies to use "in war". There may therefore be doubt about its applicability in the case of hostilities which do not amount to war in its technical sense.

     ...

     3. ... As far as chemical agents are concerned it seems unlikely that states will be prepared to forego the right to produce and stockpile such agents for possible use in war unless adequate verification procedures can be devised and applied and problems of definition, etc. resolved. However, the use of microbiological methods of warfare has never been established, and these are generally regarded with even greater abhorrence than chemical methods. The United Kingdom Delegation therefore consider that in this field the choice lies between going ahead with the formulation of new obligations and doing nothing at all — in which case the risks and the fears of eventual use of microbiological methods of warfare will continue and intensify indefinitely.

     4. The United Kingdom Delegation therefore propose the early conclusion of a new Convention for the Prohibition of Microbiological Methods of Warfare, which would supplement but not supersede the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This Convention would proscribe the use for hostile purposes of microbiological agents causing death or disease by infection in man, other animals, or crops. Under it states would:—

     (i) declare their belief that the use of microbiological methods of warfare of any kind and in any circumstances should be treated as contrary to international law and a crime against humanity;

     (ii) undertake never to engage in such methods of warfare themselves in any circumstances.

     5. The Convention should also include a ban on the production of microbiological agents ...

     ...

     10. Consideration should be given to the possibility of including in the Convention an article under which the parties would undertake to support appropriate action in accordance with the United Nations Charter to counter the use, or threatened use, of microbiological methods of warfare. If such an article were included it might be endorsed by the Security Council in rather the same way as the Council welcomed and endorsed the declarations made by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Speaking to the ENDC, Mulley says:[2]

I should stress again, as I did in my speech on 16 July [see 16 July], that our purpose is to supplement and not to supersede the Geneva Protocol of 1925. ...

     I contest the view, therefore, that the 1925 Protocol or similar declarations against first use is all we need or that ... the Geneva Protocol has prevented the use of chemical and biological warfare in the past, notably in the Second World War, and that by implication the Protocol can be relied upon to prevent the use of these horrible weapons in the future. I cannot accept that argument. I know of no evidence to support the view that Hitler did not resort to the use of gas because of respect for the Geneva Protocol. Respect for international law was not one of his strongest points, as far as I recall — and I had some first-hand experience of his concern for another Geneva Convention, concerning prisoners of war. In my opinion a more likely explanation of his restraint was fear of retaliation. And although chemical warfare was not used in the Second World War, it was used in the 1930s and has been used again since then.

     But the most eloquent evidence of the fear of the use of these weapons, and the lack of faith in the Protocol's power to prevent their use, lies in the fact that the armed forces of all the major Powers are trained and equipped to defend themselves at any rate against chemical methods of warfare, and that those countries are engaged in expensive research programmes to produce countermeasures against attack by microbiological agents. I am sure neither of those precautions will be abandoned even if the Protocol is ratified by all states.

     [1] United Kingdom, Working Paper on Microbiological Warfare, ENDC/231, 6 August 1968.
     [2] ENDC/PV.387