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CBW Events -- August 2018 selectionsEach month, entries for a small number of selected anniversaries of notable CBW-related events are posted. All will appear in the relevant final versions of the chronologies. 20 years ago:14 August 1998 The Washington Post reports that the US administration has sometimes intervened to dissuade UNSCOM from mounting particular no-notice inspections in Iraq, and had done so most recently on 4 August in regard to inspections planned for 6 August.[1] The newspaper suggests that this was because the administration wished to avoid a new crisis over Iraq. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright confirms that such intervention had indeed taken place,[2] but, as the Washington Post later puts it, she explains its purpose as being "to control the pace of confrontation with Iraq to create the best conditions in which to prevail".[3] The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Senator Sam Brownback, announces his intention of conducting a hearing on the matter as soon as the Congress reconvenes.[4]
26 August 1998 In New York, UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter [see 5–10 March] resigns from the staff of UNSCOM after six years of service. He releases his letter of resignation, in which he is sharply critical of the US government, the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary-General for their failure to act more forthrightly against Iraq.[1] The core of the letter is as follows:
Iraq has lied to the Special Commission and the world since Day One concerning the true scope and nature of its proscribed programs and weapons systems. This lie has been perpetuated over the years through systematic acts of concealment. It was for the purpose of uncovering Iraq's mechanism of concealment, and in doing so gaining access to the hidden weapons, components and weapons programs, that you created a dedicated capability to investigate Iraq's concealment activities, which I have had the privilege to head. During the period of time that this effort has been underway, the Commission has uncovered indisputable proof of a systematic concealment mechanism, run by the Presidency of Iraq and protected by the Presidential security forces.
This investigation has led the Commission to the door step of Iraq's hidden retained capability, and yet the Commission has been frustrated by Iraq's continued refusal to abide by its obligations under Security Council resolutions and the Memorandum of Understanding of 23 February 1998 to allow inspections, the Security Council's refusal to effectively respond to Iraq's actions, and now the current decision by the Security Council and the Secretary General, backed at least implicitly by the United States, to seek a "diplomatic" alternative to inspection-driven confrontation with Iraq, a decision which constitutes a surrender to the Iraqi leadership that has succeeded in thwarting the stated will of the United Nations.
Inspections do work — too well, in fact, prompting Iraq to shut them down all together. Almost without exception, every one of the impressive gains made by UNSCOM over the years in disarming Iraq can be traced to the effectiveness of the inspection regime implemented by the Special Commission. The issue of immediate, unrestricted access is, in my opinion, the cornerstone of any viable inspection regime, and as such is an issue worth fighting for. Unfortunately, others do not share this opinion, including the Security Council and the United States. The Special Commission of today, hobbled as it is by unfettered Iraqi obstruction and non-existent Security Council enforcement of its own resolutions, is not the organization I joined almost seven years ago. At a press briefing next day, UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler says that the letter of resignation, which he had accepted, expressed the strongly held views of a man of integrity — views on which, however, he declines to comment.[2]
30 years ago:1 August 1988 The reports of the UN chemical weapons investigatory mission to Iran [see 8 July] and Iraq [see 13 July] are finally published. Desire not to inhibit the incipient Iran–Iraq peace talks is widely supposed to have caused the publication delay.[1] Another theory is alleged Iraqi influence on the Arabic translation service of the UN.[2]
2 August 1988 Iraqi aircraft drop chemical weapons on four locations in Oshnaviyeh district south of Orumiyeh in western Azerbaijan province during the morning, so IRNA reports, claiming the attacks wound "several" local people.[1] The agency says that at least 1031 people have been injured from the attack, mostly with minor injuries.[2] Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati states that the attack occurred at 0245 local time, "when the innocent and unsuspecting inhabitants of Oshnaviyeh were asleep" and that the eight bombs dropped on Oshnaviyeh contained mustard gas.[3] Very soon the casualty tally rises to 1700,[4] of which 100 are reported to be seriously affected.[5] Within a week the casualty toll is given by a local official as 2265, of which 260 are said to be hospitalized.[6]
35 years ago:18 August 1983 In New York, the Iranian UN Representative, Said Rajaie Khorassani, writes to the UN Secretary-General. The main thrust of his letter is to complain that Iraq has been attacking civilians, but he includes the line: "Furthermore, the ruling regime of the Baathist Party of Iraq, in contravention of international norms, dropped chemical bombs in the operational theatre of Val Fajr-2."[1]
50 years ago:6 August 1968 In Geneva, the United Kingdom submits to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) a "Working Paper on Microbiological Warfare".[1] The paper is presented in person by British Foreign Office Minister of State Fred Mulley. The paper includes:
The United Kingdom Delegation consider that the 1925 Geneva Protocol is not an entirely satisfactory instrument for dealing with the question of chemical and microbial warfare. The following points may be noted:
(i) Many states are not parties to the Protocol and of those that are parties many, including the United Kingdom, have reserved the right to use chemical and bacteriological weapons against non-parties, violators of the Protocol and their allies.
(ii) Jurists are not agreed whether the Protocol represents customary international law or whether it is of a purely contractual nature.
(iii) Even if all states were to accede to the Protocol there would still be a risk of large-scale use of the proscribed weapons as long as states have the right to manufacture such weapons and to use them against violators and their allies.
(v) The term "bacteriological" as used in the Protocol is not sufficiently comprehensive to include the whole range of microbial agents that might be used in hostilities.
(vi) The prohibition in the Protocol applies to use "in war". There may therefore be doubt about its applicability in the case of hostilities which do not amount to war in its technical sense.
...
3. ... As far as chemical agents are concerned it seems unlikely that states will be prepared to forego the right to produce and stockpile such agents for possible use in war unless adequate verification procedures can be devised and applied and problems of definition, etc. resolved. However, the use of microbiological methods of warfare has never been established, and these are generally regarded with even greater abhorrence than chemical methods. The United Kingdom Delegation therefore consider that in this field the choice lies between going ahead with the formulation of new obligations and doing nothing at all — in which case the risks and the fears of eventual use of microbiological methods of warfare will continue and intensify indefinitely.
4. The United Kingdom Delegation therefore propose the early conclusion of a new Convention for the Prohibition of Microbiological Methods of Warfare, which would supplement but not supersede the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This Convention would proscribe the use for hostile purposes of microbiological agents causing death or disease by infection in man, other animals, or crops. Under it states would:—
(i) declare their belief that the use of microbiological methods of warfare of any kind and in any circumstances should be treated as contrary to international law and a crime against humanity;
(ii) undertake never to engage in such methods of warfare themselves in any circumstances.
5. The Convention should also include a ban on the production of microbiological agents ...
...
10. Consideration should be given to the possibility of including in the Convention an article under which the parties would undertake to support appropriate action in accordance with the United Nations Charter to counter the use, or threatened use, of microbiological methods of warfare. If such an article were included it might be endorsed by the Security Council in rather the same way as the Council welcomed and endorsed the declarations made by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Speaking to the ENDC, Mulley says:[2]
I should stress again, as I did in my speech on 16 July [see 16 July], that our purpose is to supplement and not to supersede the Geneva Protocol of 1925. ...
I contest the view, therefore, that the 1925 Protocol or similar declarations against first use is all we need or that ... the Geneva Protocol has prevented the use of chemical and biological warfare in the past, notably in the Second World War, and that by implication the Protocol can be relied upon to prevent the use of these horrible weapons in the future. I cannot accept that argument. I know of no evidence to support the view that Hitler did not resort to the use of gas because of respect for the Geneva Protocol. Respect for international law was not one of his strongest points, as far as I recall — and I had some first-hand experience of his concern for another Geneva Convention, concerning prisoners of war. In my opinion a more likely explanation of his restraint was fear of retaliation. And although chemical warfare was not used in the Second World War, it was used in the 1930s and has been used again since then.
But the most eloquent evidence of the fear of the use of these weapons, and the lack of faith in the Protocol's power to prevent their use, lies in the fact that the armed forces of all the major Powers are trained and equipped to defend themselves at any rate against chemical methods of warfare, and that those countries are engaged in expensive research programmes to produce countermeasures against attack by microbiological agents. I am sure neither of those precautions will be abandoned even if the Protocol is ratified by all states. [1] United Kingdom, Working Paper on Microbiological Warfare, ENDC/231, 6 August 1968.
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