20 years ago:

24 September 2002     The UK publishes Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government,[1] which is referred to by the Government as the "Dossier" and later the "WMD Dossier". The dossier is presented to the House of Commons which has been specially recalled to debate the Iraq crisis.
     The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, introducing the Dossier speaks of "an 11-year history: a history of UN will flouted, of lies told by Saddam ... . At any time, he could have let the inspectors back in and put the world to proof. At any time, he could have co-operated with the United Nations. Ten days ago, he made the offer unconditionally under threat of war. He could have done it at any time in the last 11 years, but he did not. Why? The dossier that we publish gives the answer. The reason is that his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programme is not an historic left-over from 1998. The inspectors are not needed to clean up the old remains. His weapons of mass destruction programme is active, detailed and growing. The policy of containment is not working. The weapons of mass destruction programme is not shut down; it is up and running now".
     Blair says the Dossier "concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shia population, and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability. On chemical weapons, the dossier shows that Iraq continues to produce chemical agents for chemical weapons; has rebuilt previously destroyed production plants across Iraq; has bought dual-use chemical facilities; has retained the key personnel formerly engaged in the chemical weapons programme; and has a serious ongoing research programme into weapons production, all of it well funded. In respect of biological weapons, again, production of biological agents has continued; facilities formerly used for biological weapons have been rebuilt; equipment has been purchased for such a programme; and again, Saddam has retained the personnel who worked on it prior to 1991. In particular, the UN inspection regime discovered that Iraq was trying to acquire mobile biological weapons facilities, which of course are easier to conceal. Present intelligence confirms that it has now got such facilities. The biological agents that we believe Iraq can produce include anthrax, botulinum, toxin, aflatoxin and ricin—all eventually result in excruciatingly painful death".[2]
     The dossier itself states: "In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq retained some chemical warfare agents, precursors, production equipment and weapons from before the Gulf War. These stocks would enable Iraq to produce significant quantities of mustard gas within weeks and of nerve agent within months. The JIC concluded that intelligence on Iraqi former chemical and biological warfare facilities, their limited reconstruction and civil production pointed to a continuing research and development programme. These chemical and biological capabilities represented the most immediate threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction ... In the last six months the JIC has confirmed its earlier judgements on Iraqi chemical and biological warfare capabilities and assessed that Iraq has the means to deliver chemical and biological weapons ... Iraq can deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive range of artillery shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles ... Iraq's current military planning specifically envisages the use of chemical and biological weapons ... Iraq's military forces are able to use chemical and biological weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place ... The Iraqi military are able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so Iraq has learnt lessons from previous UN weapons".
     Copies of the Dossier are given to the media early in the morning. On BBC Radio 4's Today, reporter Andrew Gilligan, says "it's actually rather sensibly cautious and measured in tone on the whole, there are ... a couple of sexy lines designed to make headlines for the tabloids like the fact that he can deploy within forty-five minutes if the weapons were ready and that he could reach the British bases on Cyprus, both of which we actually knew".[3]
     Responding to the Dossier, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov says: "I believe that only specialists and experts can judge whether or not Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. We have therefore sought the fastest possible return to Iraq of inspectors ... It seems to us that it is not worth creating a great propaganda furore around this report". The French Government position on the dossier, is that it has not seen proof to back up the claims therein. A spokesperson for the German Government says: "What we read there does not differ from what the German government already knew". The Iraqi Government denounces the dossier as being "full of lies" and that `the inspection team will be able in a short time to verify that such claims are baseless'.[4]
     [1] Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, published 24 September 2002.
     [2] Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Statement, 24 September 2002, Hansard (Commons), vol 390, c1–7.
     [3] Transcript, BBC Today programme, 24 September 2002, Hutton Inquiry evidence reference BBC/4/0074–0082.
     [4] A Panketh, "British dossier is scorned as "propaganda"", Independent (London), 26 September 2002.

40 years ago:

29 September 1982     In Elk Grove Village, Illinois, USA, 12 year old Mary Ann Kellerman dies of cyanide poisoning. The girl had taken a capsule of Extra-Strength Tylenol, a leading painkiller, that had been laced with the poison. Within days, the death toll rises to seven, all in the Chicago area. An early breakthrough in the case comes when members of the local fire department [who in many US areas carry out ambulance duties] realise that more than one of the patients they are dealing with had taken the painkiller.[1]
     [Note: It is these murders, still unsolved 25 years later, that lead to the introduction of tamper-proof packaging for medicines.]
     [1] Andrew H Malcolm, "100 agents hunt for killer in 7 Tylenol deaths", New York Times, 3 October 1982.

55 years ago:

15 September 1967     British Foreign Secretary, George Brown, writes to Duncan Sandys MP following their recent meeting [see 26 July]: "I undertook to consult with like-minded Governments about ways of stopping the UAR's use of gas in the Yemen. We have now consulted a number of Governments to see if they are prepared to initiate action at the United Nations, but we have unfortunately been quite unsuccessful. While all the Governments we have approached deplore the UAR's use of poison gas, they all seem to feel they have compelling reasons of national interest for not publicly taking the lead in censuring the UAR. The situation has now been very greatly altered by the agreement reached between King Faisal and President Nasser at Khartoum providing for the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from the Yemen and the cessation of all Saudi military aid. There are reliable reports that the withdrawal of Egyptian forces is to be completed within three months and preparations are already reported at Hodeida for their movement through that port. Despite past history, the chances of this agreement being carried out seem to be high.
     "In the light of this I must honestly say that I think the chances of getting any government to attack the UAR in the United Nations for its use of poison gas in the Yemen are nil. Indeed to raise the matter now would almost certainly be counter-productive. I therefore consider, and I hope you will agree, that it is not appropriate for me to continue my efforts at this time to have this issue raised at the United Nations. We shall have achieved our purpose by the departure of the UAR forces from the Yemen".[1]
     [1] As quoted in "CB Disarmament Negotiations, 1920-1970", [Volume IV of The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare series], (Stockholm/Uppsala: SIPRI/Almqvist & Wiksells, 1971), p 246.

75 years ago:

5 September 1947     The United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments debates definitions of "weapons of mass destruction" [see 14 December 1946]. This debate arises in the third meeting of the Working Committee of the Commission which finds it needs to clarify its terms of reference which are essentially to consider all armaments that are not weapons of mass destruction. The majority of the working committee is of the opinion that the best way to arrive at a definition of conventional armaments would be to start by defining weapons of mass destruction.
     The United States submits a draft resolution by which weapons of mass destruction would be defined as including "atomic explosives, radioactive material, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above".[1]
     In the discussion on this draft resolution, the UK representative suggests that weapons of mass destruction include atomic, chemical and biological weapons, while all other weapons should be considered as conventional armaments. The Australian delegate, however, thinks that radioactive material should also be regarded as a weapon of mass destruction. The representative of the United Kingdom asks the US representative why in his draft resolution he had added the word `lethal' to `chemical and biological weapons'. The reply is that this had been done in order to distinguish between deadly chemical and biological weapons and those which were not deadly such as tear gas and smoke screens, etc. The use of the word "lethal", continues the US delegate, might be subject to discussion, but if it were not adopted it would be necessary to replace it by another word expressing the same idea. Australia indicates that it would be desirable `in order to avoid confusion' to suppress the word "lethal" in the US draft. The Soviet delegate says that the US proposal fails to define atomic weapons.[2]
     [1] United States, draft resolution submitted to the working committee of the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments, UN doc. S/C.3/SC.3/7, dated 5 September 1947.
     [2] Working committee of the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments, Summary record of the third meeting held at Lake Success, New York, 5 September 1947, UN doc. S/C.3/SC.3/SR.3, dated 6 September 1947.

9 September 1947     The United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments continues to debate definitions of weapons of mass destruction [see 5 September]. Under discussion is a revised draft resolution from the United States defining weapons of mass destruction as including "atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above".[1]
     The draft is discussed at the fourth meeting of the Working Committee of the Commission. The Soviet representative criticizes the US definition as too restrictive. During World War II, he says, the Germans had used weapons other than atomic, with mass destructive effect on population and cities far from the field of battle; giving as examples the flying bomb and rocket as weapons of mass destruction, though they contained neither radioactive nor lethal chemical or biological components. The Soviet position is that an attempt to establish two lists — one consisting of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and another consisting of conventional weapons — would be a wrong method, and that general regulation and reduction of armaments should cover all kinds of armaments. The British delegate states that "V" weapons would definitely fall within the category of conventional armaments since their destructive effect, statistically considered, had not been large. The number of persons killed by the 14 000 "V" weapons dropped on England was 56 000, or four persons per weapon.
     The US revised draft resolution is adopted by seven votes to two with two abstentions. The delegations which abstain (China and Brazil) voice no objection with regard to the substance of the resolution, but indicate reservations as to the procedure.[2] [Note: those who vote against are probably the USSR and Poland, there being no roll-call.]
     The resolution as adopted by the working committee reads: "The Working Committee resolves to advise the Security Council (1) that it considers that all armaments and armed forces, except atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction, fall within its jurisdiction and that weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radio active material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above. (2) that it proposes to proceed with its work on the basis of the above definition".[3]
     [1] United States, draft resolution submitted to the Working Committee of the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments, UN doc. S/C.3/SC.3/7/Rev.1, dated 8 September 1947.
     [2] Working Committee of the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments, Summary record of the fourth meeting held at Lake Success, New York, 9 September 1947, UN doc. S/C.3/SC.3/SR.4, dated 9 September 1947.
     [3] Letter from the Chairman of the Working Committee of the Commission on Conventional Armaments addressed to the Chairman of the Commission on Conventional Armaments and enclosed resolution, [letter dated 9 September 1947], UN doc. S/C.3/24, dated 28 July 1948.